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Interest Rate Smoothing and Macroeconomic Instability under Post-Capital 
Account Liberalization Turkey 
 
 
 
 
We study how the interest rate policy of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
(CBRT) has evolved under the post-financial liberalization and deregulation era.  
Utilizing econometric methods on a generalized form of a Taylor Rule we search for 
the possible revelation of a variety of determinants of monetary policy with different 
objectives over 1994-2007.  We find that over such an extended time horizon during 
which significant shifts in the macroeconomic environment have occurred, the 
CBRT’s almost exclusive focus on “interest rate smoothing” has not changed; and 
that the CBRT has not paid any attention to developments in national income.  
 
This raises the question whether there is a deeper underlying structural constraint, 
binding the CBRT’s alleged “independence”.  We trace the basics of this deep 
structural constraint to the nature of the global financial system restricting the ability 
of the central banks to pursue “independent” policy objectives. 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction: From Inflation Targeting to Interest Rate Smoothing 
The art of modern central banking has gone through profound changes over the last two 
decades.  After long, and at times futile, debates on the specification of the macro aggregate 
that is to be targeted, or on the optimality characteristics of the so-called “objective functions”, 
the 1990s had witnessed a new sanctimony, dubbed as “inflation targeting” (IT).1  More 
properly ought to be referred as “inflation forecast targeting”, the approach was initially 
announced in New Zealand as a set of policy guidelines to help reduce the markets’ 
uncertainties in a volatile global market.  With the accumulated experiences of the crises in East 
Asia in 1997, Russia and Brazil in 1998, and Turkey and Argentina in 2001, such perceptions 
were further finessed and evolved into new concepts such as “institutional and instrument 
independence”, “credibility”, “expectations management”, and “transparency”.   
                                                 
1 In broad terms, the IT policy framework involves “the public announcement of inflation targets, coupled with a 
credible and accountable commitment on the part of government policy authorities to the achievement of these 
targets” (Setterfield, 2006: 653).  In addition, inflation targeting is usually associated with appropriate changes in 
the central bank law that enhances the independence of the institution (Bernanke, et. al. 1999, p.102; Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001, p.8. See also Buiter, 2006 for an evaluation).  For a recent assessment of the inflation 
targeting regimes, see Epstein and Yeldan (2008) and the special issues in the Journal of Post Keynesian 
Economics (2006) and International Review of Applied Economics (2008: 22/2). 
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As the IT framework deepened and elevated to the status of the new norm of global 
orthodoxy, new institutional mechanisms were also devised such as establishing a “monetary 
policy board” with a pre-announced meeting calendar, and open public display of the board’s 
meetings along with the disclosure of voting behavior of its members to “facilitate 
transparency” of the bank’s intentions. In this vein, many developing countries have changed 
their central bank laws in order to decrease the influence of democratically elected governments 
on central banks (CBs). 
Along this trend, the orthodox approach has continued to exclusively emphasize indirect, 
market based instruments, such as short term interest rates, as the primary tool of monetary 
policy. (Masson, et. al., 1997).2 Given this exclusive focus on price stability via interest rate 
responses, however, there had been a concomitant common observation that historical responses 
of the nominal interest rates to shocks had been significantly more gradual and sticky than the 
optimal policies called for by the efficiency rules.  To account for this fact, some authors noted a 
revealed desire on the part of the IT-central banks to smooth their rates of interest over and 
beyond the generally stated objective of achieving price stability.3  
Thus, the aforementioned desire for interest rate smoothing has gradually surfaced out as 
the main underlying motive of the modern CBs under the age of financial globalization.  
Consequently, in an attempt to secure investor confidence and credibility, the CBs came to be 
increasingly constrained to maintain a high and constant rate of interest  in their operations.  It is 
the purpose of this paper to document evidence to this fact from a newly “emerging market 
economy”, Turkey. 
Turkey’s recent macroeconomic history provides an interesting case study in the IT 
literature with its prolonged experience of persistent, inertial and moderately high rates of 
inflation (at around a plateau of 60-70% per annum) and highly volatile cyclical boom-bust 
growth episodes.  Turkey has completed its capital account deregulation in 1989, and in the 
                                                 
2 Note, for instance, the Bank of England’s policy mandate: “One of the Bank of England’s two core purposes is 
monetary stability (the “other” core purpose is financial stability –authors’ note).  Monetary stability means stable 
prices —low inflation- and confidence in the currency.  Stable prices are defined by the Government’s inflation 
target, which the Bank seeks to meet through the decisions on interest rates taken by the Monetary Policy 
Committee. (www.bankofengland.co.uk). (Emphases ours). 
3 See, e.g., Srour (2001); Lowe and Ellis (1998), Sack (1998a, 1998b) Drew and Plentier (2000), Mehra (2001), 
Benhabib and Uribe (2003), and Woodford (2002) for a detailed analysis of measuring the interest rate smoothing. 
In its most succinct form, the argument is that monetary authorities are assumed to minimize a loss function of the 
form: β1var(yt) + β2var(Pt) + β3var(it - it-1) where yt is real output; Pt is the price level; and it is the interest rate 
instrument.  Var(.) denotes the variance of the associated variables, and β1, β2, β3 are positive coefficients. 
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relatively short time span since then it had experienced no less than three major economic crises.  
The latest of these had erupted in early 2001, during when Turkey was following an IMF-led 
disinflation programme. The announcement of independence of the Central Bank of the 
Republic of Turkey (CBRT) came shortly after in that year.  The CBRT announced immediately 
in October of 2001 that it would follow an implicit/disguised inflation targeting rule until 
conditions were ready for full targeting, which it declared so officially in January 1, 2006. 
In what follows, in this paper we seek to provide evidence to the following questions: 
How did the CBRT’s policy objectives and strategic instruments evolve since the onset of capital 
account liberalization? What were the main determinants of the Bank’s interest rates? In 
particular, has IT changed the responsiveness of the CBRT to different macroeconomic 
indicators?  
To this end, we utilize a central bank reaction function framework which, in some ways, 
can be seen as an expanded Taylor Rule regression, over 1994-2007.  Here our aim is not to 
reveal the CBRT’s official monetary policy rules per se, but rather to document in an ex post 
sense the behavior of the CBRT under its official guidelines and responses against the 
conditionalities imposed by the international finance community.  We find that over such an 
extended time horizon during when significant shifts in the macroeconomic environment have 
occurred, the CBRT’s almost exclusive focus on “interest rate smoothing” has not changed; and 
that CBRT has not shown any response to swings in the business cycles.  This raises the 
question whether there is a deeper underlying structural constraint, binding the CBRT’s alleged 
“instrument-independence” in its conduct of monetary policy. We trace the basics of this 
structural constraint to the nature of the global financial system restricting the ability of the 
central banks to pursue “independent” policy objectives.   
The remaining pages of the paper are organized in four additional sections. Next, we 
provide a brief overview of the literature on interest rate smoothing to be followed by a short 
monetary history of Turkey since full capital account liberalization. We implement our 
econometric estimations in section four.  Finally section five summarizes and concludes. 
 
II: Empirical Evidence on Interest Rate Smoothing 
There is now a significant body of accumulated empirical evidence suggesting that CBs tend to 
change their policy interest rates only gradually; and that, they reveal even greater reluctance to 
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initiate reversals. It was argued by Lowe and Elis as early as 1998 that the interest rate 
smoothing strategy has been an important part of central banks policies in the US, Japan and 
Germany. Goodhart (1998) documents similar results in France, Italy, Canada, Spain, 
Netherlands, Belgium and Australia. In this regard, Srour (2001) cites further evidence from the 
monetary history of twelve industrialized economies where the CBs respond gradually to 
economic shocks, moving their interest rate in relatively small discrete steps in the same 
direction.  Based on time series econometrics, Srour’s results indicate that there is a sustained 
divergence between the historically realized responses of nominal interest rates and the optimal 
responses as suggested by the conventional loss functions.4  Some economists even try to find 
optimum interest rate smoothing rules (Woodford 2002). Some claim interest rate smoothing can 
decrease the volatility and contribute to stability under certain conditions (Benhabib and Uribe, 
2003). In this vein, Woodford (2002:2) claims that “a concern with interest rate smoothing on 
the part of a central bank can have desirable consequences. This is because such an objective 
can result in history-dependent central bank behavior which, when anticipated by the private 
sector, can serve the bank’s stabilization objectives through the effects upon current outcomes of 
anticipated future policy.” In contrast, however, one might also argue that in many cases it can 
also be interpreted as an indication of “constrained/passive” central banking. This would be the 
case especially if other economic variables are not claimed significant in explaining movements 
in the central banks’ interest rates. 
Several theoretical explanations had been advanced to account for this phenomenon. The 
first is based on arguments of attaining and maintaining “credibility” in an uncertain and often 
hostile world of international finance.  Monetary authorities often find it more effective to 
commit to a given level of its main instrument —the interest rate over extended periods of time 
rather than creating the image that “they are lost in the dark”.5 Third, the threat of capital flight 
in an uncertain domain warrants the CBs to follow “predictable” rules.  In order to reduce the 
risks associated with increased financialization (See, among others, Crotty, 2005; Epstein, 2005; 
Stiglitz, 2000 and 2002; Grabel, 1995), the CBs are often committed to follow simple and well-
                                                 
4 Similarly, Drew and Plentier (2003: 3) argues that “in general terms models that are typically used by researchers 
… normally suggest fairly rapid and aggressive responses of short term interest rates, even under a flexible 
approach”.    
5 From a different perspective, Caplin and Leahy (1996) advance a similar motivation. They argue that 
policymakers do not like frequent and sudden interest rate changes because they do not want to give an impression 
that they are poorly informed.  
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defined rules in the name of accountability and transparency.6  Fearing that they would lose 
credibility, the CBs often prefer to follow smooth interest rate paths, even if “optimality rules” 
from their econometric models suggest otherwise. Related with this is the relevant concern for 
avoiding financial instability.  The CBs are conditioned by the markets to avoid frequent 
variations in its instruments that would cause large swings in asset prices and the financial rates 
of return.  Such swings could cause insolvencies in public debt and might have a severe negative 
impact in the corporate balance sheets. For instance, Cukierman (1996) argues that this is a very 
important factor behind the Fed’s interest rate smoothing strategy. Third, but not the least, the 
existing uncertainty can force central banks to adjust their interest rates gradually. There are 
different types of uncertainties, which can be used to explain interest rate smoothing 
phenomena. Central banks are uncertain about the impacts of their tools on their economies 
(known as parametric uncertainty in the literature); the state of their economies (known as 
modeling uncertainty); the reliability of existing data (data uncertainty), and the characteristic 
and magnitude of future shocks.  Johnson (2005) for instance shows that “data uncertainty” may 
play an important role in interest rate smoothing. Similarly, by using a VAR model Sack 
(1998a) argues that a significant part of interest rate smoothing can be attributed to “parameter 
uncertainty”.7  
In general, as the former US Fed Chairman, Alan Greenspan (2003:1) claimed, 
“uncertainty is not just an important feature of the monetary policy landscape; it is the defining 
characteristic of that landscape”.  Thus, under the impact of uncertainty, interest rate smoothing 
may be desirable for central banks because, in the words of Srour’s (2001:2) illuminating 
description, “it is better to get more acquainted with the road conditions, and the manner in 
which the car responds during a rainstorm, before stepping on the accelerator or the brakes”. 8  
In our view, the origins of all these ideas have much to do with increased financialization 
of the world economy and intensified pressures for capital deregulation.9  “End the financial 
                                                 
6 A 2007 study by JP Morgan states, for instance, that “the incremental gain of credibility from central banks’ 
efforts to increase dialogue and accountability is minimal.  What really matters in the current conjuncture is 
maintaining clear and predictable rules for interest rates”.  JP Morgan, Daily Report, 14 May 2007. 
7 See Conway  (2000) and Greenspan (2003), discussion of the impacts of uncertainty on central banking from a 
qualitative perspective.   
8 One of the earliest discussion about the desirability of being cautious about monetary policy under uncertainty can 
be found in Brainard  (1967).     
9 Financialization, as it stands, is a loose term and no consensus yet exists among economists on its definition.  
However, starting from David Harvey’s seminal observation that “something significant has changed in the way 
capitalism has been working since about 1970” (Harvey, 1989), a set of distinguishing characteristics of the 
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repression!” were the battle cries of Mackinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), trumpeting the 
elimination of all controls that inhibit free movement of capital across the globe and urging the 
national CBs to liberalize their credit markets by abandoning all interest ceilings.  To this end, 
integration of the developing nation-economies into the evolving world financial system has 
been achieved through a series of policies aimed at liberalizing their financial sectors and 
privatizing major industries.  
The neoliberal ideology attempted to explain the motives behind financial liberalization 
arguing that such measures would restore growth and stability by raising savings and improving 
economic efficiency.  Accordingly, as the “strangulation” of financial repression is dismantled, 
loanable funds would expand; real cost of credit would fall; and the consequent increases in the 
pace of capital accumulation would generate sustained growth.  This claim, referred to as the 
McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis, provided the theoretical backbone of the neo-liberal ideology 
advocating financial de-regulation and liberalization. 
The real fact of life, however, has been quite a different story.  Following full-fledged 
financial liberalization, those developing economies that underwent financial de-regulation 
found themselves trapped within high and persistent real interest rates.  They also bore witness 
to a self-distorting foreign exchange market operating through attacks of speculative hot money 
flows into the fragile and shallow asset markets, luring the residents to over-zealous spending 
and excessive debt accumulation. Furthermore, contrary to expectations, the post-liberalization 
episodes were inflicted with the divergence of domestic savings away from fixed capital 
investments towards speculative financial instruments with often erratic and volatile yields. In 
this milieu the need for so called credible policies , existing financial instability and uncertainty 
have increased.    
Turkey has been one of the critical examples of such cases, given its mini cycles of 
(speculative) expansion-fragility-crisis episodes over its post-capital account liberalization in 
late 1989. It is to this subject we now turn. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
concept can be unveiled. Krippner (2005:174), in line with Arrighi’s The Long Twentieth Century defines it as a 
pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and 
commodity production.  According to Epstein (2005:3) “financialization means the increasing role of financial 
motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of domestic and international 
economies”. In what follows, in a broader way, we can consider financialization as a phenomenon which can be 
described by increasing financial motives, volume and impact of financial activities within and among countries. 
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III. Central Bank of Turkey under Post-Capital Account Liberalization  
Turkey has completed its financial liberalization with full deregulation of the capital account in 
August, 1989. Consequently, with the advent of elimination of controls on foreign capital 
transactions and the declaration of convertibility of the Turkish Lira in 1989, Turkey opened up 
its domestic asset markets to global financial competition.  In this setting, the Central Bank had 
to abandon its traditional instruments of monetary control and had become directly liable to the 
speculative conditions of financial arbitrage in the global markets.   
The immediate three year period after the 1989 reforms was marked with a virtual 
elimination of the “foreign exchange gap” which had crippled the Turkish macro balances for 
almost 4 decades. With the eruption of “hot money” inflows enabling abundant foreign 
exchange, Turkish commodity markets were all of a sudden flooded with cheap imports.  Erratic 
movements in the current account, a rising trade deficit (from 3.5% of GNP in 1985-88 to 6% in 
1990-93 and then again by 8% in 2000-2001) and a drastic deterioration of fiscal balances 
showed the unsustainability of the post-1989 model, with the eruption of severe financial crises 
of April, 1994 and February, 2001.  In Boratav, Türel and Yeldan’s (1995:22) words,  
“the post-1990 Turkish experience shows the serious problems confronting a 
developing economy which decides to move into full external and internal 
deregulation in the financial system under conditions of high inflation.  The specter of 
capital flight becomes the dominant motive in policy-making and creates commitment 
to high interest rates and expectations for cheap foreign exchange.  The links of these 
two policy variables with the real sphere of the economy, i.e. investment on physical 
capital and the current account balance of payments, are deeply severed. Instability in 
the rates of foreign exchange and interest rates creates feedbacks which lead the 
economy into further instability.” 
 
In Figure 1 below, we document the paths of consumer price inflation and the rates of 
interest on credit and the government’s debt instruments (GDIs) along with the overnight (O/N) 
interest rate of the Central Bank following capital account liberalization.  The turmoil following 
the currency crises of 1994 and 2001 are clearly visible.  The rate of inflation which hovered 
around the plateau of 60-80% over the 1990s, finally could have been brought under control 
after 2003. Despite the positive achievements on the disinflation front, rates of interest remained 
slow to adjust.  The real rate of interest remained above 15% through much of the post-2001 
crisis era, and generated heavy pressures against the fiscal authority in meeting its debt 
obligations.  The persistence of the real interest rates, on the other hand, had also been 
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conducive in attracting heavy flows of short term speculative finance capital over 2003 and 
2006.  This pattern continued into 2007 at an even stronger rate. 
 
 
Figure 1. Consumer Price Inflation and Selected Interest Rates Under the Post-Financial 
Liberalization Turkey 
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Source: CBRT, www.tcmb.gov.tr 
 
 
On the monetary policy front, the Central Bank of Turkey (CBRT) was granted its 
independence from political authority in October 2001.  What follows, the central bank 
announced that its sole mandate is to restore and maintain price stability in the domestic markets 
and that it will follow an implicit inflation targeting until conditions are ready for full targeting.  
Thus, over 2002 and 2003 the CBRT targeted its “net domestic asset position” as a prelude to 
full inflation targeting.  Finally in January 1, 2006 the CBRT has announced that it will adopt 
full-fledged inflation targeting.  The Bank’s current mandate is to set a “point” target of 5 
percent inflation of the consumer prices.  Given internal and external shocks, the Bank has 
recognized an internal (of 1 percent) and an external (of 2 percent) “uncertainty” band around 
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the point target. Thus, the Bank will try to keep the inflation rate at its point target; however, 
recognizing a band of maximum 2 percentage points below or above the 5% target rate.  The 
Bank has announced that it will continue to use the overnight interest rates as its main policy 
tool to reach its target. It is stated explicitly that the “sole objective of the CBRT is to provide 
price stability”, and that all other possible objectives are out of its policy realm.10 
One of the earlier attempts to estimate an (implicit) monetary policy function of the 
CBRT is the seminal paper by Berument and Malatyali (2000).  Using a generalized form of a 
Taylor-type reaction function over 1989.07 to 1997.03 Berument and Malatyali found that the 
CBRT has targeted M2Y growth, and that neither real nor nominal depreciation was sought for.  
They also report that, over the 1990s, the CBRT has not targeted currency issued, M2, net 
domestic assets, or net foreign assets, nor has taken any of the budget deficit measures into 
account while determining its monetary policy. A similar result was also deduced by Kaya 
(2006) where within a generalized Taylor form of monetary policy rule, Kaya reports that none 
of the conventional macro aggregates yield a statistically significant explanation of the behavior 
of the CBRT’s short term interest rate over the post-1990 period. 
The above results were put into a further test in Berument and Tasci (2004) where the 
authors suggest that over the 1990s the CBRT has actually used the spread between the 
interbank rate and the rate of nominal depreciation as its main policy rate, rather than the simple 
short term interest rate.  Considering monthly data over 1990.01 to 2000.10, Berument and 
Tasci found that the CBRT responded to its foreign exchange reserves, output and M2 growth; 
and that it targeted neither the future, nor the lagged inflation rate.  In other words, in the period 
immediate after capital account liberalization the CBRT was more concerned with stability of 
the markets rather than inflation.  
Us (2004 and 2006) further studied alternative monetary rules for the CBRT under the 
inflation targeting regime using a small-scale macroeconomic model. She argues that in setting 
forward rules for macro stabilization, a monetary policy rule driven by a monetary condition 
index (MCI) is superior than a simple Taylor Rule framework; and that exchange rate is an 
important variable in driving the policy reaction function. US’s (2006) results were contrasted in 
Karasoy, Kunter and Us (2006) who, utilizing a similar macroeconomic model, studied the 
                                                 
10 Further institutional details of the Central Bank’s inflation targeting framework can be found at the December 
2005 document, “General Framework of Inflation Targeting Regime and Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy for 
2006”, available on line at http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/announce/2005/ANO2005-45.pdf 
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channels under which monetary policy is transmitted within an IT regime. Their results indicate 
that at a time of weak domestic demand, output gap has been seemingly less significant in 
determining inflation. Risk premium as measured by “Embi+ Turkey” was found to have a high 
explanatory power in shaping government borrowing rate and the exchange rate.  However, 
Karasoy et. al., found no direct relationship between primary surplus (as a ratio to the GNP) and 
inflation corroborating Kaya’s (2006) results. 
 
 
IV. Econometrics of Interest Rate Smoothing 
Given the above background, we now turn our attention to the investigation of how the CBRT 
has reacted to changes in the economic conditions from 1994 to present. For this purpose, we 
will benefit from a central bank reaction function framework, which, in some senses can be 
likened to a modified version of the Taylor Rule (TR) which was first proposed by John Taylor 
in 1993.  The initial idea behind the TR was that central banks could set their interest rates by 
following a simple formula based on inflation and output gaps.  Later, Taylor himself and many 
others elaborated on this simple rule (Taylor 1999, Hebbel and Werner 2002; McCalum and 
Nelson 2004) and at a more general level, it provided the backbone of the new monetary policy 
(see among others, Romer, 2002, and Setterfield, 2006).  In devising a TR-type monetary policy, 
Woglom (2003) directs our attention to the distinction between rules for policy targets and rules 
for policy instruments.  While the former specifies “how the central bank will determine the 
value of its policy instrument such as the short term interest rate” (p. 200), the latter sets the 
broad objectives of monetary policy.   
We thus hypothesize that a TR framework can be used to capture the changes in the 
responsiveness of the CBRT to different macroeconomic variables in its conduct of monetary 
policy. Before taking further steps, however, it has to be noted at the outset that we do not claim 
that the Turkish Central Bank has officially followed a variant of the TR.  In other words, we do 
not aim at finding or disclosing a specific TR for the Turkish economy.  Rather, our direct 
purpose is to check, ex post, which explanatory variables were significant in explaining the 
historically observed behavior of the Bank’s interest rate from 1994 to the end of 2007. Hence 
our method joins the above authors in its usage of the Taylor rule, in that, rather than using it as 
a forward rule in setting the interest rate policy, we will utilize it to elucidate the CBRT’s 
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responses to changes in macroeconomic variables from 1994-2007. Furthermore, as we discuss 
below our reaction function specification is broader than the standard Taylor Rule type 
specifications. 
 
 
IV-1. Data and Periodization 
The period of our econometric analysis covers monthly observations on various macro prices 
and aggregates from July 1994 to December 2007.  Different specifications of the following 
simple dynamic Ordinary Least Square (OLS) equation were implemented to investigate which 
variables had been significant in explaining the monetary policy behind the interest rate.  Our 
main model runs as follows: 
 
ttttttt frdeptygapRR εαααπααα ++++++= −−−−− 15141312110  
 
where, Rt (Rt-1 ) stand for nominal short term interest rate at time t (t-1); πt-1 for inflation rate at 
time t-1; ygapt-1 for income gap at t-1; rdeptt-1  for nominal  exchange rate depreciation at time t-
1; and frt-1 for the federal reserve rate (US interest rate) at time t-1  
The above model can be seen as an augmented TR equation.  Some models use real 
interest rates as dependent variables instead of nominal rates. Although this method could be 
used, we think using nominal interest rates is much more relevant because changes in nominal 
interest rates are genuine responses of central banks given the fact that they cannot directly 
control the real rates.  We specifically used overnight interest rates because it has been the 
Bank’s main policy instrument.  The CBRT started using its overnight (O/N) interest rate as the 
main policy instrument after 2002.  However, the Bank used to maneuver its overnight rates 
actively in the preceding period as well.  In fact, given the fact that the CBRT abandoned its 
regulatory controls on the capital markets after the onset of deregulation, the Bank’s overnight 
interest rates had always been an important indicator of its monetary policy even before 2002.11 
However, there exist different overnight interest rate data such as “selling” and “buying” rates. 
To obtain a single data set on the O/N rates, we used weighted averages of the realized interest 
                                                 
11 As Aksoy and Leon-Ledesma (2005:6) points out “even if monetary aggregates or short term interest rates are 
not used operating targets these can be used as indicator variables  if these contain useful information ….”  
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rate data obtained from the Bank’s data sources. Furthermore, as can be seen from Figure 1 
above, the interest rates display abnormal hikes around April 1994, December 2000, and 
February 2001 which are the period of severe financial turbulences.12  In what follows we 
excluded four observations in 1994, one in 2000 and one in 2001 from our data in order to avoid 
facing outlier effects.  
For inflation we used annual changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as reported by 
the Turkish Statistics Institute (Turkstat). However, we utilize the targeted inflation minus 
expected inflation at time t as the inflation variable for the implicit inflation targeting period 
(post-crisis 2002 – 2006) as well.  The CBRT started announcing only one annual target for the 
end of the year after 2002.  To convert the end-of-year inflation target into monthly segments, 
we created monthly series by using a linear transformation based on linearly gradual decreasing 
gap between previous year’s inflation target and the current year’s inflation target. Given that 
the central banks would tend to raise interest rates to curb inflationary pressures, if the expected 
inflation rate is greater than the targeted inflation rate, the expected sign of the inflation 
coefficient is negative. 
In order to account for the output gap, we used the GDP data (calculated from the 
production side with constant 1987 prices).  To obtain the GDP gap we created a production 
index. To solve the seasonality problem we first used the X11 method and then obtained the 
potential GDP by using the classical Hodrick-Prescott filter. The expected sign of the 
coefficient is negative because a central bank is supposed to decrease its interest rates in 
response to higher GDP gap.  
In most of the “simple” versions of the TR equations, only the inflation rate and income 
gap variables were commonly used as explanatory variables. In its more modern treatment the 
nominal interest rate in lag form has become a standard component of the TR equations which 
we regard as an indication of the interest rate smoothing practices of central banks.  The 
expected sign of the coefficient of interest lag is positive under the hypothesis of interest rate 
smoothing, i.e. the central banks would maintain the sign of the past period Rt in setting their 
current rate.  High responsiveness to the lagged interest rate and small coefficients of other 
                                                 
12  Although, they go hand in hand after 2001, the realized overnight interest rate was higher before 2001.      
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variables in the reaction function can be seen important indicators of high interest rate 
smoothing (Sack and Wieland 1999).13’14 
Ball (2000) argues that for open economies an exchange rate variable should also be 
included in the TR equations because central banks have to take developments in the exchange 
markets into account for their objectives.  Indeed, movements in the exchange rate  can be a 
very important determinant of the central banks’ behavior especially in developing countries, 
where exchange rate volatility is  high and can even threaten financial stability. Central banks 
may have to prevent exchange rates from depreciation via increasing their interest rates in an 
attempt to counter the pass-through effects of higher foreign prices on domestic inflation. 
Thereby, the expected sign of the depreciation coefficient is positive. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that foreign rates of interest are also important in affecting 
the behavior of financial agents in open economies which in turn can affect the develop,ng 
country central banks’ policy responses. We thus included the Federal Reserve’s policy interest 
rates (short-term overnight interest rates) mainly to capture such international arbitrage 
effects.15 It is expected that an increase in the FED’s interest rate would typically generate a 
signaling effect and would lead to a higher interest rate in a small, open economy.  Thereby, the 
expected sign of the coefficient of the world interest rate variable is positive.  
                                                 
13 A similar method to check the interest rate smoothing tendency of central banks is  used by  Orphanides  and 
Wieland (1998). 
14 Some authors used a different method to analyze interest rate smoothing (see Judd and Rudebusch 1998, Drew 
and Plantier 2000, Woodford 2003. This method can be summarized as follows 
 
   
 
 
Where  nominal interest rate,    desired real interest rate,   inflation rate,  targeted inflation rate, the 
difference between actual and potential income,   vectors of variables which can be considered important for a 
central bank’s   decision making procedure.  Here,  indicates the interest rate smoothing of a central bank.  
Although this method is very appealing because of its partial adjustment nature and easiness we do not prefer to use 
this method. Because, this method assumes that there are desired interest rates which can be obtained from a Taylor 
type of reaction function. However, first, in general, central banks may not have desired interest rates in their mind. 
Second, even if they have desired rates in their mind we do not believe that a central bank reaction function can 
give us these desired rates. Because it requires that a central bank’s decisions are mostly driven by a Taylor type 
framework.  As we pointed out we only want to use a reaction function to assess the sensitiveness of a central bank 
to different macroeconomic indicators. And, as opposed to those who used this method we do not start with a claim 
that central banks significantly utilize a Taylor type of monetary Rule in their decision making procedure.  
 
15 Sinclair (2005) also uses the Federal Reserve  rate to check the impact of foreign interest rates .  
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Similarly, it can be claimed that the current account balance and unemployment rate can 
exert influence on central bank’s decision. However, depreciation and income gap variables 
traditionally lead to strong proxies respectively for variables accounting for the current account 
deficit and unemployment. Additions of these variables into the augmented TR equation 
inevitably may lead to econometrics problems such as multicollinearity. Hence, we excluded 
them from our analytical equation above.   
We used explanatory variables in lag forms The logic behind this rests on the 
observation that the information about the current main macroeconomic indicators especially  
about the  inflation rate and income gap is available to the central banks only in lagged fashion. 
Furthermore, using lag form may prevent us from facing endogeneity problem which may 
distorts the result significantly. 16 
 
IV-2. Regression Results 
We first checked different regression specifications for the whole period by using the Ordinary 
Least Squares method with the Newey-West procedure in order to dissect possible problems of 
heteroscedasticty and autocorrelation.17  
In the literature, Taylor type of regression results have been criticized because of the 
ignorance of the stability of the variables used in the regressions Osterholm (2003). Hence, 
before running regressions we checked if variables have unit root problems.  However, unit root 
tests notoriously demonstrate lack of statistical power. So, we employed three different unit root 
tests for the whole period and sub-periods to decide if our variables suffer from unit root 
problems. Specifically, these tests are: Agumented Dickey Fuller (ADF), Philips Perron (P-P) 
and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin  (KPSS) test statistics.  We considered a variable has a 
unit root problem if, at least, two of the tests indicate existing of unit root problem.  Results can 
be seen in Table 1.  For the whole period, ADF and P-P tests suggest that the “Federal Reserve 
rate” variable has unit root problem.  On the other hand, although, none of the variables have 
unit root problem in the first sub-period (1994-1999) the “the interest rate”, the “Federal 
                                                 
16 Many studies which used current values of these variables have been criticized on the ground that central banks 
do not have the data concerning some variables like inflation rate until at the end of the month.    
17 We first started without any correction of heterosclasticity and autocorrelation. However, in most cases we faced 
unknown characteristics of heterosclaticity and autocorrelation problems. Hence, it seems to be reasonable to use 
Newey-West procedure not to bother about these econometric problems.  
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Reserve rate”, and the “targeted-expected inflation” variables have unit root problems in the 
second sub-period (2002-2007).   
We utilized three different estimation strategies to avoid falling to the trap of spurious 
regression problem whenever we have a unit root problem. This can also enable us to have a 
more robust picture of the Bank’s interest rate policy. First we run regressions by using levels of 
all variables as if none of them has unit root problem. Second, we used the differences of the 
variables, which have unit root problems, with the levels of other variables in the regression. In 
this case, the coefficients of the variable used in difference form can be interpreted as a short-
term, rather than long-term relationships. Using levels and differences in a regression may not 
be regarded ideal; hence, we also run a regression by using the differences of the all variables. 
This makes the interpretation of the coefficients a bit more complex than that of in the 
regressions with levels.18 However, several different studies used changes of the variables to 
assess central banks’ interest policy. For example, Sinclair (2005) utilizes this strategy to 
investigate the relationship between the changes in a set of macroeconomic variables and the 
change in  interest rate policy in developing countries. And, as we pointed out, this can give us a 
more robust picture.  
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2 display the results of the regressions with levels for the 
entire period (1994-2007). The “inflation” and “interest rate” variables are significant at 1 
percent significance level in the first specification. As can be seen in Column 2, when we add 
the “Federal reserve rate” and “depreciation” variables, the “depreciation” variable became 
significant at 1 per cent significance level as well. This result did not change when we used the 
change of the “Federal reserve rate” (see column 3). Table 3 displays the results for the entire 
period when we use changes instead of levels of all variables. The coefficient of change in 
interest rate continues to be significant at 1 percent, while the coefficient of change in inflation 
variable is significant at 5 percent level.19  Furthermore, the negative sign of the coefficients of 
change in inflation and change in interest rate means that the Bank had a tendency to decrease 
the difference between the current and previous interest rates in response to increase in the 
change of lag interest variable and inflation variable.  In fact, as we will see later, this result is 
                                                 
18 In this case, all coefficients should be interpreted as indicators of short-term relationships.  
19 Coupled with these results, a very low R-squared means that this specification may not have high explanatory 
power in explaining the variation in central bank’s interest rate change policy. 
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dominated by high levels of  interest rates in the first period (1994-1999) rather than the second 
period.   
The most obvious factor affecting the CBRT’s interest rate behavior seems to be the 
direction of the preceding period’s interest rate if we treat the era spanning from 1994 to 2007 as 
one single period. The CBRT seems to be unresponsiveness to change in the national income. 
Inflation and the depreciation of exchange rates seem to be among determinants of  interest rate 
policy of the Bank although relative size of the coefficients of these variables are very small 
compared to the interest rate smoothing coefficient. Indeed. The low coefficients of other 
variables are among the indicators of interest rate smoothing.  
However, we prefer to abstain from making generalizations of these results for the whole 
period given that there had been significant structural shifts over 1994 to 2007. As discussed 
above, the Turkish economic history sustained important turning points in 1998/99 and then 
again in 2001.  In both of these years there had been significant changes in the monetary policy 
rules of the CBRT in determining its interest rate policy. First among these is the standby 
agreement signed in December 1999 between the Turkish government and the IMF. According 
to this agreement, the CBRT started to implement an inflation fighting strategy mainly based on 
nominal exchange rate anchoring. This program collapsed in February 2001 as a serious crisis 
erupted as triggered by massive capital outflows. The CBRT had to abandon its exchange rate 
based disinflation programme and accepted a huge depreciation of the Lira. After the crisis, the 
CBRT’s institutional structure had been changed significantly. The bank’s independence was 
granted and the bank began to follow a “implicit” inflation targeting regime with a flexible 
exchange regime in line with IMF’s advice in January 2002. Hence, January 2002 can be 
considered another turning point which might affect the Bank’s interest rate setting policy.20  
Thereby, ideally, we should divide our whole sample into three sub-samples namely 
1994-1999, 2000-2001 and 2002-2007.  However, the very small number of the degrees of 
freedom may cause high standard deviation and, in turn, lead to insignificant coefficients even if 
the explanatory variables would have some role in determining the Bank’s interest rate. 
Furthermore, autocorrelation and unit root problems may exacerbate the situation.  Therefore, 
                                                 
20 The classical Chow Test results also validate the structural changes over these periods. However, they are not 
very reliable.  Even so, significant institutional and policy changes at the beginning and at the end of these periods 
suggest that our partitioning is reasonable. And, this periodization is also useful for our purposes of understanding 
the impact of inflation targeting program on the Bank’s interest rate setting policy.   
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we excluded the period of 2000-2001 from our analysis.  In other words, we have mainly 
checked the Bank’s interest rate policy in the two sub-periods namely, 1994-1999 and 2002-
2007. It can further be argued that using lag inflation as an explanatory variable can be 
misleading to explain the behavior of a central bank under the inflation targeting regime because 
central banks generally may consider the deviation between targeted inflation rate and expected 
inflation rate when they implement an inflation targeting strategy. Hence, in the second period, 
we further checked whether our results would alter when we make use of the “targeted inflation 
minus expected inflation” as an explanatory variable instead of the lagged inflation rate 
First, we will discuss the econometric results for the first sub-period. All variables are 
stationary in this period (see the Column 2 in Table 1). Hence,  we will only use regressions 
with levels of the variables. The results of the regressions can be seen in Columns 1 and 2 in 
Table 4).  As can be seen in Column 1, the only significant coefficients under the reduced form 
specification are the coefficients of the lagged interest rate variable and the constant term. None 
of the remaining variables are significant.21 In this sense, interestingly, the Bank’s interest rate 
does not seem to be responsive developments in important macroeconomic variables.  
According to these results interest rate smoothing has been the main determinants of the 
CBRT’s interest rate policy in the period from 1994 to 1999.  
Secondly, we will discuss the implicit inflation targeting period (2002-2007).  As we 
pointed out before, we utilized two slightly different regression specifications for this period. 
First, we modeled a regression specification with the lagged inflation rate. Here, the interest rate 
and the Federal Reserve data have unit root problems order of 1.  Column 1 and 2 in Table 5 
display the regression results when we make use of the lagged interest rate as the inflation 
variable and using levels of all variables. It is very clear that there is a very strong interest rate 
smoothing tendency in this period. The constant term and the “lagged interest rate” are only 
significant variables in Column 1. When we add “depreciation” and “Federal reserve rate” 
variables to our base regression both variables turn out to be significant as well.  However, the 
coefficient of “lag inflation rate” is very small with a “wrong” sign, although the pair wise 
correlation between lag inflation rate and interest rate indicates high positive correlation 
                                                 
21 We also checked regressions by using differences. The results above did not change much. The only significant 
variable in interest rate lags at a 1 percent significance level when we utilize differences. . 
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between these two variables.22  With very high R-squared these are perfect text book signs of 
multi co-linearity. To deal with multi co-linearity problem there are several suggested methods 
suggested in the literature, such as obtaining more data, formalizing relationships among 
regressors, dropping a variable, specifying a relationship among some parameters, etc (see, e.g., 
Kennedy 1998: 188). Dropping a variable is the most relevant strategy for us.  When we exclude 
interest rate lag variable from the regression inflation lag variable became significant at 1 
percent significance level with correct sign.   
Furthermore, given the fact that we have unit root problems both in interest rate data and 
Federal Reserve rate data, the significance of Federal Reserve rate may be revelation of a 
spurious relation. In fact when we use the difference of the Federal Reserve Rate and that of the 
interest rates variable the results seem to support our suspicion. The coefficient of Federal 
interest rate is not significant in this specification (see column 5 in Table 5).  These findings are 
supported by the regression specification with changes of all variables instead of levels.   Table 
6 indicates that the constant term and the coefficient of change in the lag depreciation rate are 
significant at 10 percent significance level, the coefficient of change in lag interest rate and lag 
inflation are significant at 1 percent significant level.23  
To summarize our results with the lag inflation variable for the period of 2002-2007, the 
most robust findings are that the Bank’s interest rate smoothing tendency remains as the main 
determinant of its interest rate policy in this period.  In this sense, larger lag interest rate 
coefficients compared to the preceding period suggest that interest rate smoothing has become 
an even more important consideration under the new regime. The Bank’s response to inflation 
seems to be also an important factor which is in line with the inflation targeting regime. 
Furthermore, surprisingly depreciation seems to be one of the considerations even under flexible 
exchange rate regime although the magnitude of the related coefficient is not very big.   
As we pointed, we also run a set of regressions by utilizing expected inflation minus 
targeted inflation as the explanatory inflation variable instead of lag inflation variable to be able 
to capture the possibility that central banks may be concerned more with the difference of the 
                                                 
22 The pair-wise correlation between interest rate and lag inflation is 0.923 and the correlation between inflation and 
lag interest rate is 0.925. Hence, it is normal to assume the multi co-linearity is caused by the existence of lag 
interest variable with lag inflation rate. In other words, regression results may not differentiate the impact of lag 
inflation rate and lag interest rate on the Central Bank’s policy. 
23 The positive sign of the coefficient of change in interest lag indicates that interest rate smoothing is much more 
apparent in this period which could be made possible by low levels and decreasing trend in interest rates in this 
period.   
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expected and the targeted inflation rates, as some of the inflation targeting literature suggests. 
When we look at results from a regression specification with levels, the coefficient of the 
interest rate smoothing is significant at 1 percent significance level and very high (see column 1 
in Table7 ). As can be seen from column 2 in Table 7 depreciation and Federal Reserve rate 
variables are significant as well when we add them to the regression.  However, unit root 
problems and multi-colinearity problems can distort these results.  In fact, at a glance, we seem 
to have very similar problems as in the case of the preceding one. Lag inflation variable 
(targeted inflation variable minus expected inflation) is very small and has a wrong sign 
although the pair-wise correlation between inflation variable and interest rate is very high with a 
negative sign.  Again, with a very high R-squared this is indicative of a multi co-linearity 
problem.  So, we applied the same procedure as above.  When we exclude the lag interest rate 
from the regression, the coefficient of lag inflation became significant at 1 percent level with an 
expected sign.24  However, this result may not be robust because inflation, interest rate, and the 
Federal Reserve rate data have unit root problems.  To address this issue we used the differences 
of the variables suffering from unit root problems. Results can be seen in column 4 Table 7. 
Under this specification, again, the interest smoothing variable is significant at 1 percent 
significance level. And the exchange rate depreciation variable is significant at 10 percent 
significance level although the coefficient of this variable is negligibly small.  When we look at 
the results from the regression specification with the differences of all variables the picture did 
not change at all (see Table  8).  Hence, for this case, the relationship between interest rates and 
inflation; interest rates and Federal Reserve rate are not robust.  
Over the period 2002 to the end of 2007, whether we use the “lagged inflation rate” or 
the “expected minus the targeted inflation” as the relevant (explanatory) variable of “inflation”, 
the most robust conclusion is that the Bank’s interest rate smoothing tendency seemed to 
continue with an increasing magnitude and the Bank did not take developments in the business 
cycles into consideration in determining its interest rate policy.  Surprisingly the lagged 
inflation, rather than the “expected minus targeted inflation rate” seems to be a robust 
determinant of interest rate decisions of the Bank. Furthermore, there is some econometric 
                                                 
24 Furthermore, in this specification Federal Reserve rate is also significant at 10 percent level. But it has a wrong 
sign.   
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evidence that nominal exchange rate depreciation influences the Bank’s interest rate policy, 
although the magnitude of the coefficient of this variable turns out to be very small.25  
 
 
V. Conclusion 
In this paper we studied how the interest rate policy of the Central bank of the Republic of 
Turkey (CBRT) has evolved over time under the post-financial liberalization and deregulation 
era.  Utilizing econometric methods on a generalized form of a Taylor Rule we searched  for the 
possible revelation of a variety of determinants of  monetary policy with different objectives 
over 1994-2007. Our findings suggest that the lagged interest variable is the most robust 
significant variable under all specifications although the responsiveness of the Bank to some 
other macroeconomic indicators seemed to increase in the second period. Another most robust 
finding is that the income gap variable was not significant in any of our specifications.  Hence,  
It can be argued that over such an extended time horizon during when significant shifts in the 
macroeconomic environment have occurred, the CBRT’s almost exclusive focus on “interest 
rate smoothing” has not changed; and the Bank persistently ignored  (or had to ignore) the 
developments in income gap in designing its interest rate policy. These results are statistically 
significant in all cases and in all periodizations and robust to a large range of different 
specifications.    
It can be argued that in general, under the constraints of the global financial markets, 
The Turkish central bank was conditioned to following an interest rate smoothing strategy for at 
least three reasons. First of all, rising volatility along with associated uncertainty and fragility 
might make it almost impossible to determine the true picture of the economy. Secondly, related 
to the first, the Turkish Central Bank has several times only passively responded to shocks to the 
economy, as it probably was not “confident” about the outcomes of its policies (reaction of 
markets). Trying to keep interest rates constant for a sufficiently long time can thus be seen as a 
remedy against this self-acclaimed non-assurance and protecting so called credibility. Thirdly, 
even when the Bank correctly estimated the situation, its instruments might be ineffective, and 
                                                 
25 We also checked the effects of real exchange rate depreciation instead of nominal exchange rate depreciation on 
the Bank’s interest rate policy.  It appeared to be fact that, robustly, the real depreciation seem to have a slightly 
higher impact on interest rates in the second period compared to nominal depreciation, whereas real depreciation is 
not significant in the first period. 
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could not change the direction of the economy. So, the Bank might surrender the pressure of 
domestic and international markets.  
Given these structural constraints of financialization as such, we argue that with the 
advent of free capital mobility, CBs have lost their autonomy in deploying the exchange rate or 
the interest rate as strategic instruments for achieving objectives of growth, employment and 
macro stability. In an uncertain characterized by massive capital mobility, the alleged 
“independence” of the CBs means little beyond “ineptedness”.  
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Table 1: Unit Root Results (* Indicates unit root problem) 
  1994-2007 1994-1999 2002-2007 
Variables 
ADF   P-P  KPSS  ADF   P-P  KPSS  ADF   P-P  KPSS  
  t Stat 
Adj t 
Stat. LM Stat. t Stat 
Adj t 
Stat. 
LM 
Stat. t Stat 
Adj t 
Stat. 
LM 
Stat. 
 -3.450 -5.021  0.190 -5.007 -4.976  0.038 -1.926* -1.463*  0.284* 
 -1.587* -3.886 0.091 -3.420 -3.112*  0.080 -6.917 -5.790  0.264 
 -4.851 -5.077 0.04 -4.210 -4.228  0.139 -2.982* -3.213*  0.050* 
 -1.874* -1.602* 0.51 -3.842 -3.690 0.205  -1.529   
 -8.609 -8.871  0.045 -6.149 -5.994  0.243 -6.228 -5.925 0.095 
 Tar-
expec 
inf             
 -
2.761*  -2.750*  0.149* 
ADF:Agumented Dickey-Fuller Test Statistics, P-P: Philips-Perron Test Statistics ,KPSS: Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt-Shin  Test Statistics  
Null Hypothesis of ADF and P-P: Variable has a unit root , Null Hypothesis of KPSS: Variable is 
Stationary  
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Table 2: Regression Results  (1994-2007)  
(* refers significance at 1 percent significance level. ** refers 
significance at 5 percent significance level, *** refers significance at 
10 percent significance level) 
 
 1  2  3  
Variables Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient Std. Error 
              
 3.265* 1.133 3.662** 1.830 4.605* 1.534 
 0.782* 0.062 0.753* 0.073 0.716* 0.083 
 0.142* 0.043 0.151* 0.051 0.173* 0.052 
 -0.159 0.191 -0.126 0.179 -0.174 0.204 
    0.038 0.345   0.078 
        -6.701 5.006 
     0.168*** 0.092 0.171** 0.078 
R-squared 0.903   0.904   0.906   
F 473.839*   283.030*   288.202*   
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Table 3: Regression Results with differences (1994-2007) 
 1   2 
Variables Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
          
 -0.600 0.6274 -0.592 0.640 
 -0.273* 0.0949 -0.283* 0.097 
 - 0.370** 0.1912 -0.342*** 0.186 
 -0.465 0.3330 -0.437 0.328 
     2.463 3.451 
     0.134 0.087 
R-squared 0.112  0.120   
F 6.296*   4.035*   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Regression Results (1994-1999) 
  1   2   
Variables Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
        
 43.249* 11.898 52.184** 26.29 
 0.440* 0.153 0.397* 0.167 
 -0.024 0.046 -0.005 0.051 
 -0.447 0.326 -0.439 0.395 
   -1.736 3.742 
  
     0.428 0.581 
R-squared 0.238    0.248    
F 6.447*    3.958*    
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 Table 5: Regression Results (2002-07) 
 1  2  3  4  5  
Variables Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
 0.49 0.46 -1.24* 0.58 19.46* 2.26 -0.49 0.47 0.16 0.18 
 0.96* 0.04 1.02* 0.04   0.97* 0.01   
         0.36* 0.09 
 -0.001 0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.67* 0.08   -0.03* 0.01 
 -0.05 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.12 0.22 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.03 
   0.29* 0.07 -2.00* 0.42 0.21* 0.08   
 
         -0.13 1.17 
   0.11* 0.03 0.11* 0.11 0.11* 0.03 0.10* 0.03 
           
R-squared 0.994  0.996  0.910  0.996  0.548  
F 3903.00*  3068.82*  162.53*  3737.99*  15.04*  
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Table 7 (2002-07) Expected Inflation Introduce Edildi 
Variables Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
                 
 0.309 0.380 -0.768 0.387 29.614* 4.735 -0.354** 0.168 
 0.968 0.022 0.987* 0.017       
            0.514* 0.089 
 0.032 0.050 0.042 0.042 -1.312* 0.206    
            0.048 0.086 
 -0.057 0.035 -0.025 0.032 0.418 0.419 -0.031 0.032 
     0.218* 0.075 -2.569** 1.078    
            0.939 1.111 
     0.109* 0.028 -0.010 0.246 0.073** 0.032 
R-squared 0.995   0.996   0.642   0.433653   
F 3967.031   3058.689   28.646   9.494689   
Table 6 (2002-2007) Differences 
Variables Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient Std. Error 
     
 -0.207*** 0.116 -0.201 0.139 
 0.339* 0.125 0.369* 0.125 
 0.214* 0.050 0.209* 0.054 
 0.069 0.050 0.077 0.049 
   0.124 0.978 
   0.048*** 0.027 
R-squared 0.480  0.512  
F 19.703  12.998  
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 Table 8 (2002-2007) Differences 
Variables Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
 -0.330** 0.143 -0.374** 0.176
 0.531* 0.101 0.538* 0.103
 0.12 0.107 0.119 0.110
 0.069 0.056 0.075 0.052
    0.984 0.923
     0.049*** 0.029
R-
squared 0.385  0.425   
F 13.345   9.1734   
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